

APNIC ISIF FUNDING PROJECT

Developing a Collaborative BGP Routing, Analyzing and Diagnosing Platform

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Outline

- **About CERNET & CERNET2**
- **Project Information & Partnership**
- **Objectives & Deliverables**
- **Activity Plans and Timeline**
- **Governance and Collaboration**
- **Works We Have Done**

About CERNET & CERNET2

We are running 2 networks and 1 exchange point in China: CERNET/CNGI-CERNET2 / CNGI-6IX



Project Information

- Name: Developing a Collaborative BGP Routing Analyzing and Diagnosing Platform
- Co-PI: **Jilong Wang**, (Tsinghua University, CERNET, China)
- Co-PI: **Chalermpol Charnsripinyo** (ThaiREN, Thailand)
- Co-PI: **Simon Peter Green** (SingAREN, Singapore)

- Date: **Feb. 24, 2022 - Aug. 23, 2023**
- APNIC ISIF Grants : **USD\$150,000.00**
- Tsinghua University In-Kind Contribution: **USD\$69,660.00**
- Partnership: 13 Countries/Economies provided the letters of support
 - CERNET(China), ThaiREN(Thailand), SingAREN(Singapore), APAN-JP, HARNET/JUCC(Hong Kong, China), LEARN(Sri Lanka), BdREN(Bangladesh), MYREN(Malaysia), NREN(Nepal), ERNET(India), PREGINET, (Philippines), Gottingen University (Germany), Surrey University (UK), AfgREN

This is an open Project!
More participants are welcomed!

Project Team

- CERNET, China
- SingAREN, Singapore
- ThaiREN, Thailand
- BdREN, Bangladesh
- LEARN, Sri Lanka
- AfgREN, Afghanistan
- MYREN, Malaysia
- NREN, Nepal
- Gottingen University, Germany
- Surrey University, UK
- APAN-JP
- PREGINET, Philippines
- HARNETT/JUCC, Hong Kong China
- ERNET, India

More participants are welcomed!



Objectives & Deliverables

- **Build a collaborative BGP routing analyzing and diagnosing platform**
 - Looking Glass platform
 - BGP routing sharing platform
 - BGP monitoring and diagnosing platform, focusing on routing hijacking detection and mitigation system
 - BGP analysis platform, focusing on invulnerability analysis of regional routing
- **Set up a website for sharing knowledge**
- **Enhance the NREN capacity of network operation and measurement in Asia Pacific area and promote international collaborations**


Proposed Activity Plans for Further Discussion

- Set up Coordination Committee and Technical Committee by meeting with all partner organizations
- Set up a working mailing list and project website
- Arrange periodic online meetings of Coordination Committee and Technical Committee to discuss technical and collaborative issues, explore solutions and reach the consensus
- Collaborate on platform development, implementation, test and demonstration
- Deliver meeting presentations, technical documentation and periodic project reports on website and via email/Slack etc
- Organize online/offline project meetings and workshops at APAN meetings for exchanging information and building greater participation

Activity and Timeline (Draft for Further Discussion)


	Activity	Tentative Timeline
1	Kick-off the project	Feb. 2022
2	Set up Coordination Committee, Technical Committee and working mailing list	Mar., 2022
3	Set up project website	Apr., 2022
4	Discuss technical and collaborative issues and collaborate on platform development, implementation, test and demonstration	Apr. -
5	Arrange online meetings of Coordination Committee(bi-weekly) and Technical Committee(monthly)	Apr. 2022 – Jun. 2023
6	Organize online/offline project meetings(quarterly) and workshops at APAN meetings for information sharing and publicity to welcome more participation	Apr. 2022 – Jul. 2023
7	Deliver meeting presentations, technical documentation and periodic project reports on website and via emails	Jun.2022 – Jul. 2023

Governance and Collaboration



Works We Have Done


- We have received funding support from the Research and Development Program of China for “*Joint Research on IPv6 Network Management: Research Development and Demonstration*”
- A looking glass platform is under development
- A BGP routing information sharing platform is under development
- A BGP hijacking monitoring platform is under development



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
[Name](#) [Last modified](#) [Size](#) [Description](#)

readme.txt	2022-01-11 07:14	808	
ribs/	2022-02-17 12:05	-	
updates/	2022-02-17 12:45	-	



Looking Glass

- The Internet is observed differently from different network locations.
- LG is a web interface that allows us to observe the Internet from different network locations
- What LG is used for?
 - Help network administrators diagnose network faults
 - Researchers use LG to acquire data. Do active /passive measurements with the help of LG.
 - ISPs use LG to let customers experience their networks before they buy services
- We can also enjoy the above benefits by deploying LG



Looking Glass

Welcome to Hurricane Electric's Network Looking Glass. The information provided by and the support of this service are on a best effort basis. These are some of our routers at core locations within our network. We also operate a public route server accessible via telnet at route-server.he.net.

Routers

North America

- ☐ H5 Data Centers ABQ 1, Albuquerque
- ☐ Equinix Ashburn (DC2)
- ☐ Digital Realty / Telx Atlanta (ATL1), 56 Marietta
- ☐ Data Foundry Texas 1, Austin
- ☐ Zayo NP MSP1, Belle Plaine
- ☐ One Summer Boston
- ☐ Datahive Calgary
- ☐ Lumos / DC74 Data Center CLT-2 Charlotte
- ☐ ACT Cheyenne

Albuquerque, NM, US

Ashburn, VA, US

Atlanta, GA, US

Austin, TX, US

Belle Plaine, MN, US

Boston, MA, US

Calgary, AB, CA

Charlotte, NC, US

Cheyenne, WY, US

Commands

- ☐ Ping
- ☒ Traceroute
- ☐ BGP Route
- ☐ BGP Summary (IPv4)
- ☐ BGP Summary (IPv6)


Arguments

IP/Hostname:

☐ Raw output (no tables)

Looking Glass


- Commonly used commands:
 - ping
 - traceroute
 - show bgp route
- LG is very common tool
 - many AS (Especially large ISPs) have deployed LG。
- LG is in line with nature of the Internet. (openness and sharing)



The screenshot shows the Cogent Looking Glass web interface. At the top is the Cogent logo and a navigation menu with links: products & services, solutions, network, about cogent, support, and offices. Below the navigation bar is a breadcrumb trail: Home > Looking Glass. The main heading is "Looking Glass". Below this, there are three paragraphs of text explaining the tool's purpose and usage. At the bottom is a form with four columns: "Test", "Router Location", "Hostname / IP Address", and a "GO!" button. The "Test" column has a dropdown menu with options: Select Test, IPv4 Ping, IPv4 Trace (highlighted), IPv6 Ping, IPv6 Trace, and BGP. The "Router Location" column has a "Select City" dropdown. The "Hostname / IP Address" column has a text input field.

Test	Router Location	Hostname / IP Address	
Select Test ▼	Select City ▼		GO!
Select Test			
IPv4 Ping			
IPv4 Trace			
IPv6 Ping			
IPv6 Trace			
BGP			

Looking Glass Architecture



OUR WORK ON LG - CGTF LG

- <http://lg.cgtf.net>
- Open Source:
 - <https://github.com/gmazoyer/looking-glass>
- 6 Education & Research network joined
- 5 commands
- Query speed limit for security
- More partners is welcomed

CGTF Looking Glass



Router to use

CERNET Juniper Router at CNGI-6IX
ThaiREN Cisco Router
BdREN Cisco Router
SingAREN Juniper Router
MYREN Cisco router

Command to issue

show route IP_ADDRESS
show route as-path-regex AS_PATH_REGEX
show route ^AS
ping IP_ADDRESS|HOSTNAME
traceroute IP_ADDRESS|HOSTNAME

Parameter

|


Enter Reset

Help

NRENs' contribution:

CERNET, ThaiREN, BdREN, SingAREN, MYREN, LEARN

OUR WORK ON LG




3814 LGs

- Paper: “Discovering obscure looking glass sites on the web to facilitate internet measurement research”——**CoNEXT’2021**


OUR WORK ON LG

Network coverage improvements

- 910 obscure automatable LG VPs cover **288 exclusive ASes**
- Compared with the VPs provided on other platforms (RIPE RIS/ Ark/ RouteViews)
 - **Exclusively cover 262 ASes**



Most of the exclusive ASes are all **in the stub tier**




Route Information Sharing

- Looking Glass only for real time BGP route query
- RIS periodically dump BGP route for analysis and study
- Well-known RIS project
 - Route Views
 - RIPE RIS
 - PCH
 - BGPmon

Our Work on Route Information Sharing

- Collecting server : Use routing FRR[2] to simulate a real BGP router
- Border routers: Connect with the collecting server by BGP peering
- Feature: Lively Advertise Routing Announcements



BGP Routing Information Sharing Platform -CGTF RIS

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 readme.txt	2022-01-11 07:14	808	
 ribs/	2022-02-17 12:05	-	
 updates/	2022-02-17 12:45	-	

Our collector is currently peering with Following AS(Vantage Points) by private AS number 65534.

AS 23855(SINGAREN)

AS 4538(CERNET)

AS 38229(LEARN)

AS 63961(BDREN)

AS 24475(ThaiREN)

BGP RIB snapshot of collector and BGP update messages it receives are periodically dumped,
2h for rib and 20 minutes for updates messages.

You can use 'bgpdump' to decompress the compressed MRT format file for analysis.

This data is made available to anyone without restrictions.

If you copy the data and publish an analysis, please cite us in your publication.

Any question, please contact dev@dragonlab.org .

NRENs' Contribution:

- CERNET
- SingAREN
- BdREN
- LEARN
- ThaiREN

- <https://bgp.cgtf.net>
- Start from 2021-07-09
- Collector ASN : 65534

BGP Hijack

- Attackers maliciously reroute Internet traffic by announcing IP prefixes of other AS.
- BGP Hijack may cause great impact
- Countermeasures
 - Hijack Prevention
 - RPKI & BGPsec
 - Hijack detection
 - Hijack Detection System and mitigation

BGP Routing Monitoring and Analysis --BGP Watch

- <http://bgpwatch.cgtf.net>
- Knowledge-based real-time BGP hijacking Detection System
- Public BGP event reporting service
- Based on MOAS (subMOAS)
- Exclude legal MOAS by using domain knowledge and rules (ROA, IRR, AS relationship etc)



The screenshot displays the BGPWatch dashboard with the following components:

- Select event type:** Possible Hijack
- Select harm level:** All
- Time zone:** GMT+8
- Select time period (by Start Time):** 2021-11-13 16:05:08 - 2021-11-15 16:05:08
- Select for event by keywords:** Please enter search key

ID	Event Type	Event Info	Prefix Name	Prefix	Level	Start Time	End Time	Duration	Detail
1	Possible Hijack	Victim: AS4796 (KDDI-AS-KR-KR) Possible Hijacker: AS46993(CMCTELECOM-AS-VN-VN)	1	113.26.127.0/24	low	2021-11-15 14:33:52	2021-11-15 14:41:48	8:7:56	detail
2	Possible Hijack	Victim: AS749 (DNC-AS-0749-US) Possible Hijacker: AS22895(JP)	3	21.23.13.0/24	low	2021-11-15 14:33:48	2021-11-15 14:41:01	8:7:13	detail
3	Possible Hijack	Victim: AS174 (CORENET-174-US) Possible Hijacker: AS12803(VODAFONE-GROUP-IT)	1	108.179.64.0/18	low	2021-11-15 13:37:25	2021-11-15 13:40:58	3:3:30	detail
4	Possible Hijack	Victim: AS131748 (CORETELENET-AS-AP-SG) Possible Hijacker: AS130026(THINKREAM-AS-AP-HK)	1	203.208.22.0/24	low	2021-11-15 13:04:02	2021-11-15 13:21:24	0:17:22	detail
5	Possible Hijack	Victim: AS38744 (SAP-HYERS-HK-US) Possible Hijacker: AS295398(SAP_FC_FRA-DE)	3	157.133.238.0/24	enable 2 websites in the prefix	2021-11-15 13:03:58	2021-11-15 13:21:08	0:17:8	detail
6	Possible Hijack	Victim: AS43801 (NODNS-HK-HK) Possible Hijacker: AS38083(NovaNetwork-CN)	1	116.216.132.0/24	low	2021-11-15 11:37:28	2021-11-15 11:37:49	1:0:12	detail
7	Possible Hijack	Victim: AS4796 (KDDI-AS-KR-KR) Possible Hijacker: AS46993(CMCTELECOM-AS-VN-VN)	1	113.26.127.0/24	low	2021-11-15 09:40:04	2021-11-15 10:25:04	0:45:0	detail


Features --- Quick Response

- About 5 mins delay, much better than other systems
- Notify immediately when an event is detected, minimizing damage from hijackings

15	Ongoing Possible Hijack	Victim:AS58810 (IZUSCOLTD-BN,BN) Possible Hijacker:AS55547(WOODSNET-PH,PH)	1	146.88.165.0/24	low	2021-11-13 14:39:43	-	0:11:17	detail
16	Ongoing Possible Hijack	Victim:AS58810 (IZUSCOLTD-BN,BN) Possible Hijacker:AS55547(WOODSNET-PH,PH)	1	146.88.173.0/24	low	2021-11-13 14:39:43	-	0:11:17	detail
17	Ongoing Possible Hijack	Victim:AS58810 (IZUSCOLTD-BN,BN) Possible Hijacker:AS55547(WOODSNET-PH,PH)	1	43.251.69.0/24	low	2021-11-13 14:38:09	-	0:12:51	detail
18	Ongoing Possible Hijack	Victim:AS58810 (IZUSCOLTD-BN,BN) Possible Hijacker:AS55547(WOODSNET-PH,PH)	1	43.251.149.0/24	low	2021-11-13 14:38:09	-	0:12:51	detail
19	Ongoing Possible Hijack	Victim:AS58810 (IZUSCOLTD-BN,BN) Possible Hijacker:AS55547(WOODSNET-PH,PH)	1	135.84.249.0/24	low	2021-11-13 14:37:37	-	0:13:23	detail
20	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS137819 (BEEKS-AS-AP,JP) Possible Hijacker:AS206733(BFC-HK,GB)	1	103.100.74.0/24	low	2021-11-13 14:26:29	2021-11-13 14:29:46	0:3:17	detail

Features --- Event replay

- Understanding how the BGP routing changes
- Analyze the extent of the impact of the event



Features --- Event level evaluation

- Evaluate event impact based on importance of AS and prefix.

	Event Type	Event Info	Prefix Num	Prefix	Level	Start Time ⇅	End Time ⇅	Duration ⇅
1	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS18241 (SPINET,CN) Possible Hijacker:AS18214(TELUS-INTERNATIONAL,PH)	1	210.77.176.0/24	high 11 websites in the prefix.	2022-03-08 14:39:56	2022-03-08 15:11:43	0:31:47
2	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS50133 (WIMIFI,FR) Possible Hijacker:AS60304(STARNET,AL)	1	91.239.6.0/24	middle 2 websites in the prefix.	2022-03-07 18:55:58	2022-03-07 21:51:33	2:55:35
3	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS136907 (HWCLOUDS-AS-AP,HK) Possible Hijacker:AS55990(HWCSNET,CN)	2	139.9.98.0/24	middle 55990 is Cloud ID C CDN or top content provider.	2022-03-08 00:47:00	2022-03-08 06:54:05	6:7:5
4	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS18241 (SPINET,CN) Possible Hijacker:AS18214(TELUS-INTERNATIONAL,PH)	1	210.77.178.0/24	middle 3 websites in the prefix.	2022-03-08 14:39:56	2022-03-08 15:06:23	0:26:27
5	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS29538 (LINKOTEL-AS,LT) Possible Hijacker:AS209242(CLOUDFLARESPECTRUM,US)	1	45.158.56.0/24	middle 209242 is Cloud ID C CDN or top content provider.	2022-03-08 17:36:08	2022-03-08 21:17:13	3:41:5
6	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS29538 (LINKOTEL-AS,LT) Possible Hijacker:AS209242(CLOUDFLARESPECTRUM,US)	1	212.24.127.0/24	middle 209242 is Cloud ID C CDN or top content provider.	2022-03-08 17:36:08	2022-03-08 21:17:44	3:41:36

Features --- Event Statistics Analysis

- Statistical analysis of event time, affected prefix, AS, country, etc.
- Global routing system security situational awareness



Features - Low False Negative , Low False Positive

- We use monitors all over the world (RIPE RIS & RouteViews & CGTF RIS)
- We check every BGP update message and use a lot of domain knowledge and rules for detecting

middle level

Possible Hijack Events

124.156.136.0/22-0 Possible Hijack Events

Victim AS: 132203

Victim Country: CN (China)

Victim Description: TENCENT-NET-AP-CN

Start Time: 2021-11-08 17:03:38

During Time: 0:10:8

Hijacker AS: 64

Hijacker Country: US (United States)

Hijacker Description: MITRE-AS-2

End Time: 2021-11-08 17:13:46


Comparison

	BGPWatch	CAIDA HI3	bgpstream
Real-time delay	5mins delay	More than 2 hours	More than 2 hours
Event replay	√	×	√
Event statistical analysis	√	×	×
Event level evaluation	√	×	×
Benign MOAS report	√	√	×
Reported hijack events per day	About 15-25	About 30-40	Less than 10
medium-scale Hijack events	√	√	√

Case-study – 1 UAB mezon Hijacking

- 2021-10-25 09:55 UTC AS212046 (UAB Mezon, Lithuania, AS rank:11754/73296) hijacked more than 2807 prefixes and 445 ASNs in 30 countries.

- Alarmed on multiple platforms
 - CGTF BGPwatch (Alarm first)
 - CAIDA HI3
 - Cisco BGPstream
 - Qrator Labs (through twitter)



Case-study – 1 UAB mezon Hijacking

BGPWatch observed that

- Duration varies with the hijacked prefixes, range from several seconds to tens of hours
- More 40 prefixes have websites
- The most affected country is Latvia(LV), more than 111 prefixes in LV were hijacked
- This event is very likely to be a malicious hijacking

1	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	6	31.170.16.0/21	high	11 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:52:06	2021-10-25 10:02:47	0:10:41	detail
2	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	18	94.140.112.0/23	high	18 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:55:49	2021-10-25 10:02:04	0:6:15	detail
3	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	7	94.140.123.0/24	high	52 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-22 09:40:55	2021-10-22 09:46:42	0:5:47	detail
4	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	1	185.61.150.0/24	high	8 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:55:51	2021-10-25 10:03:45	0:7:54	detail
5	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43108 (GARM-AS,GB) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	1	91.194.76.0/23	high	37 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:52:14	2021-10-25 10:01:40	0:9:26	detail
6	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43108 (GARM-AS,GB) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	1	91.228.4.0/22	high	14 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:55:49	2021-10-25 10:01:40	0:5:51	detail
7	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	1	5.44.216.0/21	high	52 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:52:06	2021-10-25 10:03:13	0:11:7	detail

Case-study – 2 IHOME-AS Hijacking

- 2021-11-9 00:21:00 UTC or so , AS 25478 (IHOME, Russia , owns 5~7 prefixes) hijacked more than 181 prefixes and 135 ASes from 32 countries about 5 minutes
- Our system alarmed this event first again, about 5 minutes after the events happened
- At 10:23 Beijing Time (2:23 UTC, 2 hours after the event), bgpstram and CAIDA HI3 still no report (later , both platforms reported it)

BGP hijack by AS25478?

Aftab Siddiqui aftab.siddiqui@gmail.com

Tue Nov 9 07:50:53 UTC 2021

- Previous message (by thread): [BGP hijack by AS25478?](#)
- Next message (by thread): [BGP hijack by AS25478?](#)
- Messages sorted by: [\[date\]](#) [\[thread\]](#) [\[subject\]](#) [\[author\]](#)


Noction - could be but there were not many specifics in around 3200 routes they originated, there were few /12, /13, /14

mistake probably.


```
121.128.0.0/12 39120 65478 25478
121.128.0.0/12 61568 65478 25478
121.144.0.0/13 61568 65478 25478
141.48.0.0/13 61568 65478 25478
203.40.0.0/13 39120 65478 25478
203.40.0.0/13 61568 65478 25478
```

Not Secure — bgpwatch.cgtf.net										
3	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43108 (GARM-AS,GB) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	1	91.228.4.0/22	high	14 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:55:49	2021-10-25 10:01:40	0:5:51	detail
4	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	1	5.44.216.0/21	high	52 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-10-25 09:52:06	2021-10-25 10:03:13	0:11:7	detail
5	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS394695 (PUBLIC-DOMAIN-REGISTRY,US) Possible Hijacker:AS25478(IHOME-AS,RU)	1	103.21.58.0/23	high	697 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-11-09 00:20:45	2021-11-09 00:26:25	0:5:40	detail
6	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS15679 (CIS,OM) Possible Hijacker:AS25478(IHOME-AS,RU)	1	188.65.24.0/24	high	11 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-11-09 00:20:17	2021-11-09 00:26:25	0:6:8	detail
7	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS203301 (datacenter,GE) Possible Hijacker:AS25478(IHOME-AS,RU)	1	185.139.56.0/22	high	9 websites in the prefix,too many!	2021-11-09 00:21:30	2021-11-09 00:26:28	0:4:58	detail
8	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	6	31.170.16.0/21	middle	5 websites in the prefix.	2021-10-25 09:52:06	2021-10-25 10:02:47	0:10:41	detail
9	Possible Hijack	Victim:AS43513 (NANO-AS,LV) Possible Hijacker:AS212046(MEZON-LT,LT)	7	94.140.123.0/24	middle	5 websites in the prefix.	2021-10-22 09:40:55	2021-10-22 09:46:42	0:5:47	detail

Cyberspace Map



The cyberspace map is based on the original attributes of cyberspace: IP address, Protocol Port, and AS Number. The right is the geographic map. Cyberspace measurement information is displayed simultaneously on the two map system.



Looking forward to collaborating with all of you!
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